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Abstract
In the present paper, the existence and
multiplicity problems of extensions are
addressed. The focus is on extension of the
stable type. The main result of the paper is an
elegant characterization of the existence and
multiplicity of extensions in terms of the
notion of dialectical justification, a close
cousin of the notion of admissibility. The
characterization is given in the context of the
particular logic for dialectical argumentation
DEFLOG. The results are of direct relevance
for several well-established models of
defeasible reasoning (like default logic, logic
programming and argumentation frameworks),
since elsewhere dialectical argumentation has
been shown to have close formal connections
with these models.
1 INTRODUCTION
When a theory is interpreted in the context of logics for
defeasible reasoning, e.g., in terms of the theory’s
extensions, it occurs for many such logics that there
exist theories that cannot be interpreted at all or that
have more than one interpretation.
For instance, in Reiter’s (1980) well-known logic
for default reasoning, a theory’s extensions can be
thought of as its interpretations. The simplest theory
without extension consists of only the default true : ¬p
/ p. A basic example of a theory with more than one
extension consists of the facts p and q and the defaults
p: r / r and q : ¬r / ¬r.
For a good understanding of defeasible reasoning, it
is natural to investigate under what circumstances
theories are (so to speak) defeasibly interpretable, in the
sense of having an extension, and under what
circumstances their defeasible interpretation is
ambiguous, in the sense of having more than one
extension.
Several properties of theories have been discussed
that guarantee the existence of extensions. For instance,
in the context of his default logic, Reiter (1980) defined
normal theories, that could be shown to have at least
one extension. Etherington (1987) defined ordered
theories and showed that ordered, semi-normal theories
always have an extension (cf. also Papadimitriou and
Sideri 1994). More results and references are for
instance given by Gabbay et al. (1994) and Brewka et
al.(1997).
In the present paper, the notorious extension
existence and extension multiplicity problems are
addressed in the context of a specific form of defeasible
reasoning, viz. dialectical argumentation. In dialectical
argumentation, statements are not only adduced as
reasons for other statements, but also as reasons against.
As a result of this possibility of simultaneously
supporting and attacking statements, there can be
statements that are justified (e.g. since there is a
justifying reason for the statement) and statements that
are defeated (e.g. since there is a defeating reason
against the statement). Chesñevar et al. (2000) and
Prakken and Vreeswijk (to appear) give overviews of
models of dialectical argumentation. Formal models of
dialectical argumentation are closely related to other
nonmonotonic logics, as has especially been shown by
Dung (1995) and Bondarenko et al. (1997). As a result,
it comes as no surprise that the existence and
multiplicity problems also arise in the context of
dialectical argumentation. Dung (1995) and
Bondarenko et al. (1997) give several relevant results in
this respect (for different possible kinds of extensions).
In the present paper, the focus is on extensions of
the stable type (cf. Gelfond and Lifschitz’s (1988)
stable models of logic programming, Dung’s (1995)
stable extensions of argumentation frameworks, and
Bondarenko et al.’s (1997) stable extensions of
assumption-based frameworks). The notion of
dialectical justification is introduced and is shown to
play a central role in the solution of the extension
existence and multiplicity problems. The main results
of the paper are characterizations of the existence of an
extension and of the number of extensions in terms of
dialectical justification. By a meta-analysis , it is shown
that the notion of dialectical justification is vital in the
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characterization of the existence and the multiplicity of
extensions.
The results are proven for a particular formalization
of dialectical argumentation, viz. DEFLOG (Verheij
2000a, b). The system is related to my work on
automated argument assistance (e.g., Verheij 1999).
DEFLOG is formally closely related to Dung’s (1995)
and Bondarenko et al.’s (1997) formalizations. For
Dung’s (1995) argumentation frameworks, the
connection is formally established in section 4 below.
With respect to the logical language, DEFLOG differs
from Dung’s (1995) and Bondarenko et al.’s (1997)
formalizations in that it allows the explicit expression in
the logical object language of support and attack and of
the defeat of a statement. As a result, support and attack
become subject to dispute. The defeat of a statement is
as a variant of negation, called dialectical negation. In
contrast, Dung (1995) (who does not discuss support)
uses a fixed, undisputable attack relation. Bondarenko
et al. (1997) use a fixed, undisputable set of rules of
inference to express support. They use a domain-
dependent mapping of sentences to their contraries that
already hints at the explicit expression of defeat in the
logical object language.
By the already mentioned close formal relations
between well-established models of defeasible
reasoning (like default logic, logic programming and
argumentation frameworks) and models of dialectical
argumentation, the results proven for DEFLOG are of
direct relevance for these models.
2 DIALECTICAL
ARGUMENTATION
The context of the present work is dialectical argu-
mentation. Here follows a brief introduction along the
lines of my recent work on that topic (Verheij 1999,
2000a, b).
In dialectical argumentation, statements can not
only support other statements, but also attack them. For
instance, as a reason to support that Peter shot George,
the statement can be made that some witness, say A,
states that Peter shot George:
The exclamation mark indicates an assumed statement,
the question mark a statement that is at issue. (The
graphical presentation of arguments is based on
previous work by the present author.) Here the issue
that Peter shot George is settled (the statement is
justified, as is indicated by the dark, bold font) since
there is a justifying reason for it, namely A’s testimony.
As a reason against the issue that Peter shot George,
the statement can be made that some other witness, say
B, states that the shooting did not take place:
Assuming only B’s testimony (not A’s), the issue that
Peter shot George is again settled, but this time the
statement is defeated, as is indicated by the struck-
through font. (Note that here B’s testimony is used to
argue against the statement that Peter shot George, and
not to argue for the statement that Peter did not shoot
George. As will be seen in the formal discussion below,
arguing against a statement is treated as arguing for the
statement’s so-called dialectical negation, which is not
necessarily equivalent to arguing for its ordinary
negation.)
That some statement supports or attacks another
statement can itself be at issue. For instance, it can be
argued that A’s testimony supports that Peter shot
George since witness testimonies are often truthful:
Likewise, a reason can be given to support that some
statement attacks another statement.
A’s unreliability can be adduced in order to attack
that A’s testimony supports that Peter shot George:
 
Here the issue that Peter shot George is unsettled, as is
indicated by the light italic font, since it is not justified
(e.g., by a justifying reason for it) nor defeated (e.g., by
a defeating reason against it). Similarly, a reason can be
given to attack that some statement attacks another
statement.
3 DEFLOG - A LOGIC OF
DIALECTICAL
INTERPRETATION
3.1
 
THE DIALECTICAL
INTERPRETATION OF THEORIES
The ideas on dialectical argumentation discussed in
section 2 can be made formally precise in terms of the
logical system DEFLOG (Verheij 2000a). Its starting
point is a simple logical language with two connectives
× and   . The first is a unary connective that is used to
express the defeat of a statement, the latter is a binary
connective that is used to express that one statement
supports another. When ϕ and ψ are sentences, then ×ϕ
(ϕ’s so-called dialectical negation) expresses that the
statement that ϕ is defeated, and (ϕ    ψ) that the
statement that ϕ supports the statement that ψ. Attack,
denoted as  , is defined in terms of these two
connectives: ϕ   ψ is defined as ϕ   ×ψ, and expresses
that the statement that ϕ attacks the statement that ψ, or
equivalently that the statement that ϕ supports that the
statement that ψ is defeated. When p, q, r and s are
elementary sentences, then p   (q   r), p   ×(q   ×r)
and (p   q)   (p   ×(r   s)) are some examples of
sentences. (For convenience, outer brackets are
omitted.)
The central definition of DEFLOG is its notion of the
dialectical interpretation of a theory. Formally,
DEFLOG’s dialectical interpretations of theories are a
variant of Reiter’s (1980) extensions of default theories,
Gelfond and Lifschitz’s (1988) stable models of logic
programming, Dung’s (1995) stable extensions of
argumentation frameworks, and Bondarenko et al.’s
(1997) stable extensions of assumption-based
frameworks.1
A theory is any set of sentences, and when it is
dialectically interpreted, all sentences in the theory are
evaluated, either as justified or as defeated. (This is in
contrast with the interpretation of theories in standard
logic, where all sentences in an interpreted theory are
assigned the same positive value, namely true, e.g., by
giving a model of the theory.)
An assignment of the values justified or defeated to
the sentences in a theory gives rise to a dialectical
interpretation of the theory, when two properties obtain.
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 In section 4, a formal connection with Dung’s
(1995) work is discussed. More relations between the
formalisms mentioned are e.g. discussed by Dung
(1995) and in the extended manuscript on which the
present is based (Verheij 2000a). To guide intuition, the
following may be useful. A default p : q / r (as in
Reiter’s 1980) would in DEFLOG be translated to two
conditionals, viz. p   r and ¬q   ×(p  r). The second
says that the former is defeated in case of ¬q. This
corresponds to the intuition underlying the default that r
follows from p as long as q can consistently be
assumed. (Note however that the properties of ordinary
negation ¬ are not part of DEFLOG proper.) A rule in
logic programming p   q, ~r corresponds in DEFLOG to
two conditionals, viz. q   p and r   ×(q   p). The
second says that q   p is defeated in case of r. This
corresponds to the intuition underlying the program rule
that p follows from q when r is not provable, but not
when r is provable.
First, the justified part of the theory must be conflict-
free. Second, the justified part of the theory must attack
all sentences in the defeated part. Formally the
definitions are as follows.
(i) Let T be a set of sentences and ϕ a sentence. Then
T supports ϕ when ϕ is in T or follows from T by
the repeated application of  -Modus ponens (i.e.,
from ϕ   ψ and ϕ, conclude ψ). T attacks ϕ when
T supports ×ϕ.
(ii) Let T be a set of sentences. Then T is conflict-free
when there is no sentence ϕ that is both supported
and attacked by T.
(iii) Let ∆ be a set of sentences, and let J and D be
subsets of ∆ that have no elements in common and
that have ∆ as their union. Then (J, D)
dialectically interprets the theory ∆ when J is
conflict-free and attacks all sentences in D. The
sentences in J are the justified statements of the
theory ∆, the sentences in D the defeated
statements.
(iv) Let ∆ be a set of sentences and let (J, D)
dialectically interpret the theory ∆. Then (Supp(J),
Att(J)) is a dialectical interpretation or extension
of the theory ∆. Here Supp(J) denotes the set of
sentences supported by J, and Att(J) the set of
sentences attacked by J. The sentences in Supp(J)
are the justified statements of the dialectical
interpretation, the sentences in Att(J) the defeated
statements.
Note that when (J, D) dialectically interprets ∆ and
(Supp(J), Att(J)) is the corresponding dialectical
interpretation, J is equal to Supp(J) ∩ ∆, and D to Att(J)
∩ ∆. It is convenient to say that a dialectical
interpretation (Supp(J), Att(J)) of a theory ∆ is specified
by J.
The examples discussed in section 2 can be used to
illustrate these definitions. Let s express Peter’s
shooting of George, a A’s testimony, b B’s testimony, t
the truthfulness of testimonies, and u A’s unreliability.
Then the first example corresponds to the two-sentence
theory {a, a   s}. The arrow in the figure corresponds
to the sentence a   s. The theory has a unique extension
in which all statements of the theory are justified. In the
extension, one other statement is justified, viz. s. The
second example corresponds to the theory {b, b   ×s}.
The arrow ending in a cross in the figure corresponds to
the sentence b   ×s. The theory has a unique extension
in which again all sentences of the theory are justified.
In the extension, there are two other interpreted
statements, viz. ×s, which is justified, and s, which is
defeated. (The reader may wish to check that the theory
{b, b   ×s, s}, which is not conflict-free, has the same
unique extension, but that one of the statements in the
theory is defeated.) The third example corresponds to
the theory {a, t, t    (a    s)}. In its unique extension, all
statements of the theory are justified, and in addition a
   s and s. The fourth example corresponds to the theory
{a, u, u    ×(a    s)}. In its unique extension, a    s is
defeated and s is not interpreted (i.e., neither justified
nor defeated). (The theory {a, u, u    ×(a    s), a    s} is
not conflict-free, but has the same unique extension.)
DEFLOG’s connectives    and × are obviously
reminiscent of propositional logic’s connectives → and
¬. Also some of DEFLOG’s definitions remind of
propositional logic. These likenesses have been
incorporated on purpose. In fact, DEFLOG has been
carefully designed to be as close as possible to
propositional logic (as the paradigmatic example of
deductive logic), while retaining the essence of
defeasible logic.2
DEFLOG’s connectives are not equivalent to
propositional logic’s connectives. For instance, the set
{p, ×p} is not inconsistent, in the dialectical sense: the
theory {p, ×p} has a unique dialectical interpretation in
which p is defeated and ×p justified. Of course {p, ¬p}
is classically inconsistent. The theory {p, ×p} shows the
essence of dialectical negation: the dialectical negation
of a sentence in a sense ‘prevails’ over the sentence.3
By this prevalence of dialectical negation, assumptions
are only prima facie justified: a prima facie assumption
is not actually justified when the dialectical negation of
the assumption is (actually) justified.
The theory {p, ×p} also shows that dialectical
interpretation is not simply maximal consistency:
whereas the maximal consistent subset {×p}
corresponds to a (the) dialectical interpretation, but {p}
does not.
Verheij (2000a) gives much more information on
DEFLOG, for instance, on different ways to adapt
DEFLOG to incorporate the classical logical
connectives. (DEFLOG’s connectives    and × are not
meant to replace the classical connectives; they express
different concepts.)
It is not hard to see that DEFLOG is non-monotonic,
for instance in the following sense: when a sentence is
justified in some dialectical interpretation of a theory, it
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 One result of this exercise is that I have come to
believe that the concept of dialectical negation (along
with the corresponding concept of dialectical
interpretation) is the essential difference between a
deductive and a defeasible logic.
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 Note that the prevalence relation between a sentence
p and its weak negation ~p in logic programming is
exactly opposite to that between a sentence p and its
dialectical negation ×p: in logic programming ~p can be
assumed as long as p is not provable, while in
dialectical argumentation p can be assumed as long as
×p is not justified.
need not be in a dialectical interpretation of a larger
theory. The simplest example is provided by the
theories {p} and {p, ×p}. Both have only one dialectical
interpretation. In the dialectical interpretation of {p}, p
is justified, but in that of {p, ×p}, p is defeated (and ×p
justified).
Notwithstanding the simple structure of DEFLOG’s
logical language (with only two connectives, viz.    and
×), many central notions of dialectical argumentation
can be analyzed in terms of it. For instance, it is
possible to define an inconclusive conditional (i.e., a
conditional of which the consequent does not always
follow when its antecedent obtains) in terms of
DEFLOG’s defeasible conditional (that is defeasible in
the same way as any other statement). DEFLOG’s
expressiveness also allows an integrated analysis of
Toulmin’s (1958) warrants and backings and Pollock’s
(1987) undercutting and rebutting defeaters. A warrant
and an undercutter can be seen as the support and
attack, respectively, of the relation between a reason
and its conclusion. Undercutting and rebutting defeaters
become different instances of the general phenomenon
of defeat. Cf. Verheij (2000a, 2001).
3.2 THEORIES WITHOUT EXTENSIONS
AND THEORIES WITH SEVERAL
EXTENSIONS
The examples of theories discussed above all had a
unique extension. Several were examples of the
following general property: a conflict-free theory
always has a unique extension, namely the extension
specified by the theory itself. The simplest theory that is
not conflict-free with a unique extension is {p, ×p}. In
its extension, p is defeated and ×p justified. Other
important examples of theories that are not conflict-
free, but do have a unique extension are {p, q, q    ×p}
and {p, q, r, q    ×p, r    ×q}. In the former theory, the
statement that p, is attacked by the statement that q. In
its unique extension, q and ×p are justified and p is
defeated. In the latter theory, a superset of the former,
in addition to q’s attack of p, r attacks q. In its unique
extension, p, ×q and r are justified, and q is defeated.
The theories together provide an example of
reinstatement: a statement is first defeated, since it is
attacked by a counterargument, but becomes justified
by the addition of a counterattack, i.e., an attack against
the counterargument. Here p is reinstated: it is first
successfully attacked by q, but the attack is then
countered by r attacking q.
There are however also theories with no or with
several extensions:
(i) The three theories {p, p    ×p}, {p, p    q, ×q} and
{pi | i is a natural number} ∪ {pj    ×pi | i and j are
natural numbers, such that i < j} lack extensions.
For the latter theory, this can be seen as follows.
Assume that there is an extension E in which for
some natural number n pn is justified. Then all pm
with m > n must be defeated in E, for if such a pm
were justified, pn could not be justified. But that is
impossible, for the defeat of a pm with m > n can
only be the result of an attack by a justified pm’ with
m’ > m. As a result, no pi can be justified in E. But
then all pi must be defeated in E, which is
impossible since the defeat of a pi can only be the
result of an attack by a justified pj with j > i. (Note
that any finite subset of the latter theory has an
extension, while the whole theory does not. This
shows a ‘non-compactness’ property4 of
extensions.)
(ii) The three theories {p, q, p    ×q, q    ×p}, {pi, pi+1  
×pi | i is a natural number} and {×ip | i is a natural
number} have two extensions. Here ×ip denotes, for
any natural number i, the sentence composed of a
length i sequence of the connective ×, followed by
the constant p. (Note that each finite subset of the
latter theory has a unique extension, showing
another non-compactness property.)
Traditionally, the main example of multiple extensions
is the Nixon diamond. In Reiter’s (1980) default logic,
it looks thus:
q, r
q : p / p
r : ¬p / ¬p
These express that Nixon is a quaker and a republican,
and that quakers are pacifists, while republicans are
non-pacifists. Reiter’s definitions give rise to two
extensions. In one, p follows by the application of the
first default, in the other, ¬p follows by the application
of the first default.
It may be thought that its DEFLOG representation
has the form {q, r, q    p, r    ×p}. However, this set
does not have a dialectical interpretation. A good
representation of the Nixon diamond consists of the
following assumptions:
q, r
q    p
r    ¬p
(q & (q    p))    ×(r    ¬p)
(r & (r    ¬p))    ×(q    p)
Here (ϕ & ψ)    χ abbreviates ϕ    (ψ    χ). The
connective ¬ is intended to express ordinary negation.
The latter two conditionals express that when q justifies
p (expressed by the conjunction of q and q    p), it is
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 A property P of sets is called compact if a set S has
property P whenever all its finite subsets have the
property. Cf. the compactness of satisfiability in first-
order predicate logic.
defeated that r implies ¬p, and that when r is actually
justified, it is defeated that q implies p. In each of the
two dialectical interpretations of these assumptions, one
of q    p and r    ¬p is defeated, the other justified. In
the DEFLOG formalization, the conditionals q    p and r
 
 ¬p stand for the ‘application’ of the corresponding
Reiter defaults, while the conditionals (q & q    p)  
×(r    ¬p) and (r & r    ¬p)    ×(q    p) express when
that application is blocked. The difference between the
Reiter and the DEFLOG formalization has to do with the
fact that Reiter’s defaults are inconclusive (their
consequent does not always follow when their
antecedent obtains), while DEFLOG uses conditionals
that are prima facie justified, just like other
assumptions. Cf. also Verheij (2000a). Note that the
opposition between p and ¬p is not represented in
terms of dialectical negation (i.e., as p and ×p): ordinary
negation and dialectical negation are different notions.
3.3 DIALECTICALLY JUSTIFYING
ARGUMENTS
Before we proceed to the notion of dialectical
justification, some terminology needs to be introduced.
(i) A set of sentences is an argument when it is
conflict-free. If ∆ is a set of sentences, a ∆-
argument is an argument that is a subset of ∆.
(ii) Let ϕ be a sentence. An argument C is an
argument for ϕ if C supports ϕ. An argument C is
an argument against ϕ if C attacks ϕ. The
sentences in an argument C are also called its
premises, the sentences ϕ such that C supports ϕ,
its conclusions.
(iii) An argument C attacks an argument C’ if C
attacks a sentence in C’.
(iv) Arguments C and C’ are compatible when C ∪ C’
is an argument, and otherwise incompatible. The
arguments in a collection {Ci}i ∈ I are compatible if
their union ∪i ∈ I Ci is an argument, otherwise
incompatible.
In the following figure, three arguments are graphically
suggested.
ϕ ×ϕ
ϕ
A B C
The bottoms of the alpine shapes consist of the
premises of the argument; the tops are the conclusions.
Argument A has conclusion ϕ, argument B conclusion
×ϕ and argument C has premise ϕ. B attacks C, but not
necessarily A (since ϕ might not be a premise of A). A
and B are incompatible, and B and C are too.
When a theory has a dialectical interpretation, the
set of sentences of the theory that are justified in the
interpretation, clearly form an argument. It has a special
property:
Proposition
Let E be an extension of a theory ∆. Then J(E) ∩ ∆
is a ∆-argument that attacks any ∆-argument C that
is incompatible with J(E) ∩ ∆. Here J(E) denotes
the set of justified statements of the extension E.
Proof: Since E is an extension, J(E) ∩ ∆ is conflict-
free. Hence a ∆-argument C that is incompatible with
J(E) ∩ ∆ cannot be a subset of J(E) ∩ ∆ since J(E) ∩ ∆
is not incompatible with any of its subsets. Therefore
there is a sentence ϕ in C that is not in J(E) ∩ ∆. Since
E is an extension, it is in D(E), the set of defeated
sentences of the extension E. But for any sentence ϕ in
D(E) it holds by the definition of extensions that J(E) ∩
∆ attacks ϕ, and therefore attacks C. QED
Arguments with the property that J(E) ∩ ∆ has in the
proposition above, are said to be dialectically justifying:
(v) A ∆-argument C is dialectically justifying with
respect to ∆ if and only if C attacks every ∆-
argument C’ that is incompatible with C.
(vi) A sentence ϕ is dialectically justifiable with
respect to a set of sentences ∆ if and only if there
is a ∆-argument C for ϕ that is dialectically
justifying with respect to ∆. Such an argument C
is then called a dialectical justification of ϕ, and C
dialectically justifies ϕ with respect to ∆. A
sentence ϕ is dialectically defeasible with respect
to ∆ if and only if ×ϕ is dialectically justifiable
with respect to ∆. If C is a dialectical justification
of ϕ, then the argument C dialectically defeats ϕ
with respect to ∆.
(vii) A sentence ϕ is dialectically interpretable with
respect to a set of sentences ∆ if and only if it is
dialectically justifiable or dialectically defeasible
with respect to ∆. A sentence ϕ is dialectically
ambiguous with respect to a set of sentences ∆ if
and only if it is both dialectically justifiable and
dialectically defeasible with respect to ∆.
The argument {p, r, r    ×q} dialectically justifies p
with respect to the theory {p, q, r, q    ×p, r    ×q}. The
argument {p} does not dialectically justify p since the
incompatible argument {q, q    ×p} is not attacked. The
argument {r, r    ×q} dialectically defeats q with respect
to the theory.
The sentences p and q are dialectically ambiguous
with respect to the theory {p, q, p    ×q, q    ×p} since
the argument {p, p    ×q} dialectically justifies p and
dialectically defeats q, and likewise for q.
The sentence p is not dialectically interpretable with
respect to the theory {p, p    ×p}.
Note that when an argument is dialectically
justifying with respect to a theory, it dialectically
justifies all the sentences it supports.
3.4 THE EXISTENCE AND MULTIPLICITY
OF EXTENSIONS
When a theory has a dialectical interpretation, all
sentences in the theory are dialectically interpretable. In
other words, dialectical justification is a kind of ‘local’
dialectical interpretation. This is an immediate corollary
of the proposition proven in section 3.3:
Corollary
Let E be an extension of the theory ∆. Then all
sentences in the theory are dialectically justifiable
or dialectically defeasible with respect to ∆.
Proof: By the proposition of section 3.3, J(E) ∩ ∆
dialectically justifies or defeats all sentences in ∆. QED
Note that the corollary gives a necessary condition for
the existence of an extension: when there is a sentence
in a theory that is not dialectically interpretable, there
cannot be an extension. The corollary can explain all
examples of theories without extensions that have been
encountered above: in all, there is a sentence that is not
dialectically interpretable. Nevertheless the condition in
the corollary is not sufficient for the existence of an
extension, as the theory ∆ = {p, q, p    ×q, q    ×p, r, r  
×r, s, s    ×s, p    ×r, q    ×s} shows. It has no
extension. Nevertheless all sentences in the theory are
dialectically justifiable or defeasible with respect to ∆.
The ∆-argument {p, p    ×q, p    ×r} dialectically
justifies p and dialectically defeats q and r, while {q, q
 
 ×p, q    ×s} dialectically justifies q and dialectically
defeats p and r.
The notion of dialectical justification plays the
central role in the main theorem of the present paper,
that shows exactly under which circumstances a theory
has an extension. One additional definition is needed.
(viii) Let C be an argument. A sentence ϕ is
dialectically justifiable in the context C with
respect to a theory ∆ if it is supported by a
dialectically justifying argument of the theory that
contains C, and dialectically defeasible in the
context C if ×ϕ is supported by a dialectically
justifying argument that contains C.
Using this terminology, the main theorem can be
formulated:
Theorem
A theory ∆ has an extension if and only if there is an
argument C in the context of which all sentences in
∆ are either dialectically justifiable or dialectically
defeasible with respect to the theory, but not both.
(The proof follows below.) In other words, a theory has
an extension if and only if there is a context in which all
sentences of the theory are dialectically interpretable,
while none is dialectically ambiguous. The theorem is
closely related to the corollary above that says that the
dialectical interpretability of all sentences of a theory is
necessary for the existence of an extension. The
theorem says that the dialectical interpretability of all
sentences in a context with no dialectical ambiguities is
both necessary and sufficient for the existence of an
extension. After fixing all choices allowed by a
dialectically ambiguous sentence in the theory, it
suffices for the existence of an extension that all
sentences in the theory are either dialectically
justifiable or dialectically defeasible. The example that
showed why the dialectical interpretability of all
sentences of a theory is not sufficient for the existence
of an extension, shows what can go wrong: the
dialectical justification of one sentence (or its
dialectical negation) need not be compatible with that
of another when there is a dialectical ambiguity. In
other words, the dialectical justification of sentences
can depend on the particular choice allowed by a
dialectical ambiguity. Dialectical justifications that
require different choices cannot be ‘glued’ to form an
extension.
Three properties of dialectical justification are
essential in the proof of the theorem:
Proposition
(i) Localization: Let E be an extension of a theory ∆.
Then there is a collection {Ci}i ∈ I of arguments
that covers J(E) ∩ ∆ (i.e., J(E) ∩ ∆ is equal to ∪i ∈
I Ci), that are dialectically justifying with respect
to the theory.
(ii) Union: If C and C’ are compatible arguments, that
are dialectically justifying with respect to a theory
∆, then also C ∪ C’ is dialectically justifying with
respect to the theory. (Similarly, for collections of
dialectically justifying arguments: the union of a
compatible collection of dialectically justifying
arguments is again dialectically justifying.)
(iii) Separation at the base:5 If C and C’ are
incompatible arguments, that are dialectically
justifying with respect to a theory ∆, then there is
a sentence in ∆ that is both dialectically justifiable
and defeasible with respect to ∆. (Similarly, for
                                                          
5
 The property is called separation at the base since
the dialectically ambiguous sentence can be found in
the theory itself.
collections of dialectically justifying arguments:
given an incompatible collection of dialectically
justifying arguments, there is a sentence in the
theory that is both dialectically justifiable and
defeasible.)
Proof: Localization follows from the proposition at the
beginning of this section: it shows that J(E) ∩ ∆ is itself
dialectically justifying with respect to ∆. The union
property (for pairs of arguments) is seen as follows. Let
C and C’ be compatible dialectically justifying
arguments, and let the argument C’’ be incompatible
with C ∪ C’. Assume first that C’’ is incompatible with
C. Then clearly C attacks C’’. Assume second that C’’
is compatible with C. Then C’ is incompatible with the
argument C ∪ C’’, and therefore attacks it. Since C and
C’ are compatible, it then follows that C’ attacks C’’.
The proof of the general case of the union property
requires some extra care, but is similar. The property of
separation at the base follows directly from the
definition of dialectical justification: when C and C’ are
dialectically justifying and incompatible, they attack
each other. Then there is a sentence in each (and
therefore in the theory itself) that is attacked by the
other. The general case of the separation property can
be reduced to the case of pairs of arguments. QED
Proof of the main theorem: First let E be an extension
of ∆. Then by the localization property J(E) ∩ ∆ can be
covered by arguments that are dialectically justifying
with respect to ∆. By the union property, it then follows
that J(E) ∩ ∆ is also dialectically justifying. (In fact, the
proof of the corollary at the beginning of the section
directly shows that J(E) ∩ ∆ is dialectically justifying.)
As a result, J(E) ∩ ∆ is a context as in the theorem
since by the fact that J(E) ∩ ∆ is dialectically justifying
and by the definition of extensions all sentences in ∆
are dialectically interpretable in the context of J(E) ∩ ∆,
and since by the fact that J(E) ∩ ∆ is conflict-free there
is no dialectically ambiguous sentence in that context.
Second let C be a context as in the theorem, and let, for
all sentences ϕ, Cϕ be a ∆-argument dialectically
justifying or defeating ϕ in the context C. The
collection of the Cϕ is compatible since by the property
of separation at the base there would otherwise be a
sentence in the theory that is dialectically ambiguous in
the context C. By the union property, the union of the
Cϕ is dialectically justifying. It specifies an extension of
∆. QED
The proof shows that extensions can be built by
‘gluing’ dialectically justifying arguments. This
suggests that a (set-theoretically minimal) argument
that dialectically justifies a sentence, is a kind of
‘dialectical proof’ of the sentence.  Similarly, such a
dialectical proof of the dialectical negation of a
sentence is a kind of ‘dialectical refutation’ of the
sentence.
The following theorem provides a general answer to
the extension existence and multiplicity problems in the
context of dialectical argumentation. It is a corollary of
the main theorem above:
Theorem
Let n be a natural (or cardinal) number (possibly 0).
A theory ∆ has exactly n extensions if and only if n
is equal to the maximal number of mutually
incompatible arguments C in the context of which
all sentences in ∆ are either dialectically justifiable
or dialectically defeasible with respect to the theory,
but not both.
4 DUNG’S ARGUMENTATION
FRAMEWORKS AND
ADMISSIBILITY
Dung’s (1995) argumentation frameworks are a fruitful
abstraction of ideas from nonmonotonic reasoning and
logic programming. Here it is shown how Dung’s
argumentation frameworks can be mimicked in
DEFLOG. Since Dung has shown that his argumentation
frameworks have close formal connections with well-
established models of defeasible reasoning, such as
Reiter’s (1980) default logic and logic programming,
the results on DefLog presented here become of direct
relevance for these models. Moreover it is shown why
Dung’s notion of admissibility cannot in general
replace that of dialectical justification in the
characterizations of the existence and of the number of
extensions of a theory proven above.
Formally, an argumentation framework consists of a
set, its elements called arguments, and a binary relation
on that set, the attack relation. When (A, B) is in the
attack relation, the argument A is said to attack B.
In Dung’s work, the notion of admissibility is
central. It is closely related to DEFLOG’s dialectical
justification. Using DEFLOG’s terminology, an
argument C is admissible with respect to a theory ∆ if C
attacks any ∆-argument attacking it. This definition of
admissibility depends of course on DEFLOG’s particular
notions of argument and attack. There is however a
straightforward way of mimicking Dung’s
argumentation frameworks in DEFLOG for which this
definition of admissibility is indeed an extrapolation of
Dung’s admissibility, as follows.
Let each argument of an argumentation framework
be an elementary sentence in DEFLOG’s language. Then
an argumentation framework can be translated to a
theory in DEFLOG by taking the union of the set of
arguments in the framework and the set of sentences of
the form A    ×B, for any element (A, B) of the attack
relation of the framework. In addition, it is easy to
restrict DEFLOG’s language in such a way that any
theory in this restricted language corresponds to an
argumentation framework in Dung’s sense: simply
allow only elementary sentences and sentences of the
form ϕ    ×ψ, where ϕ and ψ are elementary. Let’s call
sentences in this restricted sense Dung sentences and
theories consisting of Dung sentences Dung theories.
It is now straightforward to check that several of
Dung’s notions coincide with DEFLOG’s under this
translation. Some care is needed however since certain
terms have different meanings in Dung’s work and in
DEFLOG. For instance, the use of the term ‘argument’ is
different. Conflict-free sets of arguments (in Dung’s
sense) correspond however with conflict-free sets of
Dung sentences (in DEFLOG’s sense), Dung’s
admissible sets of arguments correspond to the
admissible arguments of Dung theories (in DEFLOG’s
sense), and Dung’s stable extensions of argumentation
frameworks correspond with DEFLOG’s extensions of
Dung theories. In the extended manuscript on which the
present paper is based (Verheij 2000a), these results are
formally established. The proofs are straightforward.
For theories using DEFLOG’s full language,
dialectical justification and admissibility are easily seen
to be different notions, but on the restricted language of
Dung’s frameworks, the notions coincide:
Proposition
Let ∆ be a Dung theory. Then a ∆-argument is
dialectically justifying with respect to ∆ if and only
if it is admissible with respect to ∆.
Proof: Dialectically justifying arguments are always
admissible. (This does not depend on ∆ being a Dung
theory.) Let now C be an admissible argument, and let
C’ be an argument incompatible with C. Since C and C’
consist of Dung sentences, the incompatibility of C and
C’ implies that C attacks C’ or that C’ attacks C. In case
C’ attacks C, also C attacks C’ since C is admissible.
This shows that C is dialectically justifying. QED
Note that by this result the theorems on the extension
existence and multiplicity problems can for Dung
theories be rephrased in terms of admissibility instead
of dialectical justification. This is not the case for
theories in general. Then the notion of dialectical
justification is essential. The key point is that
admissibility does not have all of the properties used in
the proof of the main theorem of this paper. These
properties are localization, union and separation at the
base.
The analogues of these properties for admissibility
can be found by replacing ‘dialectically justifying’ by
‘admissible’ in the formulation of the properties. For
instance, the union property (for pairs of arguments) for
admissibility reads thus: if C and C’ are compatible
arguments, that are admissible with respect to a theory
∆, then also C ∪ C’ is admissible with respect to the
theory. Separation at the base becomes (again for pairs
of arguments): if C and C’ are incompatible arguments,
that are admissible with respect to a theory ∆, then there
are opposites ϕ and ψ in the theory, such that C
supports ϕ and C’ supports ψ.
It is not hard to see that admissibility has the
localization and union properties, but lacks the property
of separation at the base.
For instance, that for admissibility, the property of
separation at the base does not obtain, can be seen by
inspection of the theory {p1, p1    q, p2, p2    (q    ×q)}.
With respect to the theory, there are four admissible
arguments with a maximal number of elements, viz.
each three-element subset of the theory. (Note that each
argument of the theory is admissible since there are no
attacking arguments.) Any pair of these arguments is
incompatible, yet there is no sentence that is defeated
by an argument, let alone by an admissible argument, as
is required by the property of separation at the base.
That the localization property obtains for
admissibility is straightforward: since, when E is an
extension of a theory ∆, J(E) ∩ ∆ is dialectically
justifying with respect to ∆, J(E) ∩ ∆ is certainly
admissible.
The proof of the union property for admissibility is
almost trivial since any attack of the union of a
collection of arguments is also an attack of one of the
arguments in the collection.
Inspection of the proof of the main theorem of the
paper shows that the property of separation at the base
is only used in the ‘if’-part. The ‘only if’-part indeed
has an analogue for admissibility since it only uses
localization and union. The theory {p1, p1    q, p2, p2  
(q    ×q)} (the counterexample against the property of
separation at the base) shows that the analogue of the
‘if’-part is in fact not true. All sentences in the theory
are ‘admissibly justifiable’, i.e., supported by an
admissible argument, since any argument of the theory
is admissible. No sentence in the theory is ‘admissibly
defeasible’, i.e., attacked by an admissible argument,
since there is no attacking argument at all. Still, the
theory has no extension.
Verheij (2000a) expands this meta-analysis for other
results (e.g., concerning so-called dialectically preferred
and admissibly preferred arguments, i.e., those
dialectically justifying or admissible arguments that are
maximal with respect to set inclusion) and for other
notions that are similar to dialectical justification.
Bondarenko et al. (1997) have used admissibility in
their discussion of an abstract, argumentation-theoretic
approach to default reasoning. Their setting is just as
Dung’s (1995) related to DEFLOG’s, yet they focus on
deductive systems. Interestingly, whereas in DEFLOG
dialectical negation × is treated as an ordinary
connective, Bondarenko et al. consider the question
which sentences are the contraries of others as part of
the domain theory (as the mapping from sentences to
their contraries is explicitly represented in their
assumption-based frameworks). It seems that the notion
of dialectical justification can be directly transplanted
to their system. For the reasons, discussed here and in
section 3.4, it can be expected that dialectical
justification has better properties for analyzing
assumption-based frameworks than admissibility.
5 CONCLUSION
A characterization of the existence of extensions (in the
context of dialectical argumentation) has been
established that shows that the dialectical
interpretability of all sentences in a theory suffices for
the existence of an extension provided that all
dialectical ambiguities in the theory are fixed. A
characterization of the multiplicity of extensions
immediately follows.
Whether these characterizations should be regarded
as solutions to the extension existence and multiplicity
problems depends on one’s taste. The notion of
dialectical interpretation (a typical specimen of the
genus of stable extensions) has been connected to the
notion of dialectical justification, itself not a very
simple notion. The complexity of the problems does
however not suggest a really simple solution.
In an important sense, the connection can however
be regarded as a reduction: dialectical interpretation is a
global notion (of interpreting a theory as a whole),
whereas dialectical justification is a local notion (of
interpreting a sentence with respect to a theory). The
characterization shows how the global and local notions
are connected. The characterization makes it formally
precise that local interpretability is a requirement of
global interpretability, and that global ambiguity has its
roots in local ambiguity.
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